William J. Fulbright

At What Cost the Israel Lobby?

More than 46 years ago, President John F. Kennedy sought to preclude a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. In June 1963, he wrote the last in a series of insistent letters to Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion. Those letters sought what Israel now demands of Iran: international inspections of its nuclear facilities. The key difference: Kennedy knew for certain that Israel, while portraying itself a friend and ally, repeatedly lied to Kennedy about its nuclear weapons development at the Dimona reactor in the Negev Desert.

Best estimates point to sometime between 1962 and 1964 when Israel produced its first weapon in what is now a vast nuclear arsenal estimated at 200-400 warheads. Kennedy’s letter to Ben-Gurion was anything but friendly. The words he chose were drawn not from diplomacy but from the instructions that a judge gives a jury on criminal culpability. In that brusque letter, the U.S. commander-in-chief insisted that this purported ally prove “beyond a reasonable doubt” that the Zionist enclave was not developing nuclear weapons.

One day after that June 15^th letter was cabled to Tel Aviv for delivery by the U.S. ambassador, Ben-Gurion abruptly resigned citing undisclosed personal reasons. As his resignation was announced before the letter could be physically delivered, Jewish authors routinely claim that Kennedy’s message failed to reach Ben-Gurion. Nonsense. That interpretative gloss ignores what we now know about Israeli operations inside serial U.S. presidencies—and about Tel Aviv’s routine intercept of White House communications.

Deprived of an Israeli government with which to negotiate, Kennedy was denied a national security victory that may well have spared the world a problem he foresaw almost a half-century ago. In retrospect, that Israeli conduct raises topical questions about the ability of the U.S.—or any nation—to hold Zionist extremists accountable.

The Khazars vs. the Kennedys

During this same 1962-63 period, Senator William J. Fulbright of Arkansas, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, convened hearings on the legal status of the American Zionist Council. The AZC received funds from the Jewish Agency, a predecessor to the state of Israel. As a recipient of U.S. taxpayer funds, the Jewish Agency used those funds to lobby for more funds. Under U.S. law, that conduct required the AZC to register as a foreign agent.

Attorney General Robert Kennedy joined Fulbright in that quest. That effort was thwarted by the Israel lobby and then by the death of President Kennedy. Thereafter, concerns about the impact of Zionist influence on U.S. policy making continued to grow. By 1973, Fulbright could announce with confidence: “Israel controls the U.S. Senate.” In 1974, he lost his Senate seat. [See: “How the Israel Lobby Took Control of U.S. Foreign Policy.”]

Fast-forward to today and imagine the Middle East without an enclave of nuclear-armed Zionist extremists. The threat that Kennedy posed to Tel Aviv’s arsenal was eliminated five months after Ben-Gurion’s strategically well-timed resignation. When Vice President Lyndon Johnson was sworn in as his successor, LBJ quickly increased the arms budget for Israel. Imagine today’s Zionist influence on U.S. policy had Fulbright and the Kennedys succeeded in requiring that the lobby register as what it is: a foreign agent.

Following the Kennedy assassination in November 1963, Nicholas Katzenbach replaced RFK as Attorney General. Soon thereafter, the AZC evaded registration as it morphed into the American Israel Public Affairs Committee. AIPAC now oversees a transnational network of pro-Israeli political operatives commonly known as “the Israel lobby.”

The Kennedy/Fulbright risk to Zionist influence reemerged five years later when Robert Kennedy announced his candidacy for the presidency during the height of an unpopular war that was vastly expanded under the leadership of the Texan who replaced his brother as president. Another Kennedy presidency posed for Tel Aviv a two-fold threat.

First, Robert Kennedy’s peace candidacy revived the possibility that he would pursue his brother’s agenda and target Israel’s nuclear arsenal in order to preclude a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. Second, with Fulbright still wielding influence on U.S. foreign policy, a Kennedy administration revived concerns about restrictions on the Israel lobby.

When this charismatic contender surged in the political polls, that threat was eliminated June 5, 1968 at a campaign event in Los Angeles. His death at the hand of Sirhan Sirhan, a Palestinian émigré, coincided with the first anniversary of the Six-Day War. The assassin later cited as his motive Kennedy’s campaign pledge to provide more fighter jets to Israel.

With that murder, the road to the presidency was cleared for Richard Nixon. When lobbied by Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, Nixon readily agreed to endorse an “ambiguous” status for Israel’s nuclear arsenal, akin to “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.”

Special Standard for a Special Friend

Due to its “special relationship” with the U.S., Tel Aviv remains a non-signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Its Dimona facility has never been subjected to the inspections it now seeks for Iran. But for photographs taken inside the Dimona facility in 1986 by nuclear technician Mordecai Vanunu, that “ambiguity” might well remain intact.

The International Atomic Energy Agency has repeatedly certified that Iran is not enriching uranium beyond the 3.5% required for nuclear energy. Tehran has agreed to send its uranium abroad for the further enrichment required for medicine (19.5%), a level still well below the 90% required for nuclear weapons.

In mid-September, the U.S. intelligence agencies reported to the White House that their assessment since the National Intelligence Estimate of November 2007 remains unchanged. They still do not believe that Iran has resumed nuclear weapons development work

What about Israel? What has their lobby been doing? Answer: lobbying. As during the Kennedy era, Tel Aviv remains focused on a single goal: ensuring that its ally and patron continues a six-decade policy ensuring that Israel is not held accountable—for anything.

At what cost has the U.S. acted as if the Israel lobby is not a foreign agent? The strategic issue faced by Fulbright and the Kennedys remains unresolved: how best can the U.S. eliminate Israeli influence as a threat to national security? Since that fateful letter of June 1963, what has been the cost of this lobby to U.S. interests? What costs have been imposed on others by this special relationship? At what point will Americans say: Enough!

William J. Fulbright

How Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal Endangers Us All

On September 24^th, U.S. President Barack Obama will preside over a U.N. Security Council session on nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. In March 2010, Moscow will host a Global Nuclear Summit that the U.S. has agreed to attend.

The next six months could prove hopeful or harmful—depending on the impact on Israel’s nuclear arsenal. With U.S. backing, Tel Aviv has thus far avoided compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty—joining North Korea, India and Pakistan.

President John F. Kennedy tried to stop Israel from starting a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. In a June 1963 letter to Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, he insisted on proof “beyond a reasonable doubt” that Israel was not developing nuclear weapons at its Dimona reactor facility. Though his letter was cabled to the U.S. embassy, Ben-Gurion resigned (citing undisclosed personal reasons) before the message could be physically delivered.

With Israel’s nuclear ambitions under attack by its key ally, that strategically well-timed resignation duped an inexperienced young president and denied him a diplomatic victory that might well have precluded the wars now being waged in the Middle East.

With Ben-Gurion’s resignation, JFK was left without an Israeli government with which he could negotiate. By the time a new government was formed, the Kennedy threat had been eliminated and Tel Aviv could start haggling from scratch with successor Lyndon Johnson who was far more sympathetic to the goals of the Zionist state.

That strategy resurfaced in the recent resignation of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert just as the Road Map gained traction and the threat of peace loomed on the horizon. Olmert’s successor, Benjamin Netanyahu, then used the terms of the Road Map as a bargaining chip to start haggling—with an inexperienced young president—over sanctions against Iran.

Democrat Lyndon Johnson proved himself a reliably pliant pro-Israeli president as did his successor, Republican Richard Nixon. Described by Prime Minister Golda Meir as “the best friend Israel ever had,” Nixon agreed in 1969 to endorse “constructive ambiguity” as a means for Tel Aviv to obscure its nuclear arsenal. Meanwhile Colonial Zionists brandished the threat of that arsenal to seize land they sought for Greater Israel.

Israeli incursions provoked the reactions one would expect, enabling Tel Aviv to portray itself as a hapless victim in need of U.S. support in a hostile and anti-Semitic neighborhood. Four years after Kennedy wrote to Ben-Gurion, Israel mounted a massive six-day assault on neighboring nations, occupying lands that remain at the heart of the hostilities against which Tel Aviv insists it needs nuclear weapons to defend itself.

With the war in Iraq poised to expand to Iran, the next six months offer a rare opportunity to revisit not only Israel’s nuclear arsenal but also—in light of the consistency of its behavior over six decades—the legitimacy of the Zionist enterprise.

Managing the Threat to Zionism: JFK, RFK and Fulbright

In 1962, Senator William Fulbright of Arkansas, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, convened hearings to ensure that the American Zionist Council—funded by the Jewish Agency—register as the agent of a foreign government. JFK was then president and brother Robert his attorney general. Edward (”Ted”) Kennedy was elected to the Senate that year to fill his brother Jack’s seat. In October 1963, the Department of Justice—led by Robert Kennedy—demanded that the Council register as a foreign agent.

Following the Kennedy assassination in November 1963, Nicholas Katzenbach succeeded RFK as Attorney General for Lyndon Johnson. To avoid registration, the Zionist Council morphed into the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). That umbrella organization—still disguised as a domestic lobby—continues to coordinate the efforts of dozens of organizations that sustain a U.S. policy environment favorable to a foreign nation.

The Kennedy brothers shared a little-known insight into the confidence with which Israel wields political influence across party lines. In the closing weeks of his 1960 presidential campaign, candidate Kennedy traveled to New York to seek financial support from Jewish business leaders. On his return to Washington, he called his old friend Charlie Bartlett who had introduced Jack to Jackie.

According to Bartlett, Kennedy was livid after those he met in Manhattan assured him that the funds he sought were available but only if he turned over to them the formulation of U.S. policy in the Middle East. With brother “Bobby” his chief campaign strategist, that experience doubtless came to mind when, in 1963, JFK confirmed that Israel—while portraying itself a U.S. ally—repeatedly lied to him about its development of nuclear weapons.

Israel vs. the Kennedys

At the height an unpopular war in Vietnam, Robert Kennedy emerged to challenge the policies of the Texan who replaced his brother as president in 1963. No one knows for sure that, as president, RFK would have followed JFK’s stance on the Zionist state’s nuclear arsenal. Nor do we know for certain that he would have renewed his insistence that the Israel lobby register as the agent of a foreign government.

When a second Kennedy threat was eliminated with an assassination in June 1968, Tel Aviv welcomed to the White House Richard Nixon who supported Israel’s strategically essential “ambiguous” policy on nuclear arms. Nixon Attorney General John Mitchell was a partner in the same New York law firm (Mudge, Rose, Guthrie & Alexander) that Nixon joined in 1963 after his failed bids as president, losing to JFK in 1960, and as governor of California two years later. In honor of Nixon’s arrival, the dominantly Jewish firm was renamed Nixon, Mudge, Rose, Guthrie & Alexander.

In 1973, five years after RFK’s death, Senator Fulbright could announce with confidence that “Israel controls the U.S. Senate.” By 1974, he was replaced in the Senate. Journalist Helen Thomas was then covering Nixon, one of ten presidents in her lengthy career as White House correspondent. In Obama’s first press conference, she sought to clarify the ambiguity about just who posed a nuclear threat in the region. Her question for this latest Commander in Chief: which nation in the Middle East has nuclear weapons?

In response, Chicagoan Barack Obama did the “Tel Aviv Two-Step.” Rather than answer the question, he spoke about the need for nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. Not since then has Thomas been allowed to ask another question. Instead she was subjected to a withering barrage of personal attacks by pro-Zionist broadcasters who sought to make it appear that she—not the answer to her question—is the problem.

At every opportunity, Tel Aviv insists that Tehran’s nuclear energy program poses an “existential threat.” That claim is correct though not for the reason that the Israel lobby would have Americans believe. If Israel cannot persuade the U.S. to join (or condone) an attack on Iran, some faint semblance of stability may yet be attained in the Middle East. With stability will come an opportunity to confirm the common source of the fixed intelligence that induced the U.S. to invade Iraq in response to the mass murder of 911.

Only one nation had the means, motive, opportunity and, importantly, the stable nation state intelligence to mount such a deception inside the U.S. As that fact becomes apparent, an informed American public will insist that its leadership revisit the legitimacy of the Zionist enterprise along with the costs that this “special relationship” has imposed on the U.S. in blood, treasure and hard-earned credibility.

Israel is the Real Threat to Israel

The existential threat to Israel is real but its source is not Iran. The real threat is the facts that Tel Aviv may again obscure if it succeeds in provoking yet another crisis in the region.  Those facts confirm the illegitimacy of the Zionist enterprise as a nation state.

The threat to Barack Obama could become existential should he act consistent with his oath of office. As yet he has shown no inclination to address the perils that this entangled alliance with Jewish extremists imposes on U.S. national security and on the prospects for peace.

As the source of the duplicity that induced the U.S. to war becomes known, Americans will insist on accountability. Zionist fanatics may choose another course. A modern-day Masada is a nuclear possibility. With their vast arsenal (estimates range from 200 to 400 warheads), these religious extremists could preempt accountability by creating chaos worldwide while affixing blame on “Islamo” fascists in an attempt to keep their victim status plausibly intact.

To eliminate the existential threat posed by nuclear-armed religious extremists requires that the U.S.—as Israel’s key ally—isolate the Zionist enterprise, withdraw its recognition as a legitimate state and reclassify its advocates as foreign agents. That long overdue change in the legal status of the Israel lobby—first sought in 1962—will enable U.S. law enforcement to pursue its operatives for giving aid and comfort to an enemy within.

The focal point for peace in the Middle East should not be those nations that do not have nuclear weapons but the one nation that does. Absent external pressure, Israeli behavior will not change. Those who seek peace in the region must boycott Israeli exports, divest from Israeli firms and insist on sanctions against Israel akin to those it seeks against others. Anything less will ensure that Zionist extremists continue to endanger us all.

See also:

McCain Family Secret: The Cover-up

Appeasing Israel – At What Cost?

How Israel Controls the US

William J. Fulbright

How the Israel Lobby Took Control of U.S. Foreign Policy

In the early 1960s, Senator William J. Fulbright fought to force the American Zionist Council to register as agents of a foreign government. The Council eluded registration by reorganizing as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee. AIPAC has since become what Fulbright most feared: a foreign agent dominating American foreign policy while disguised as a domestic lobby.

Israelis and pro-Israelis object when they hear that charge. How, they ask, can we so few wield such influence over so many? Answer: it’s all in the math. And in the single-issue advocacy brought to bear on U.S. policy-making by dozens of ‘domestic’ organizations that now compose the Israel lobby, with AIPAC its most visible force.

The political math was enabled by Senator John McCain whose support for all things Israeli ensured him the GOP nomination to succeed Christian-Zionist G.W. Bush. McCain’s style of campaign finance reform proved a perfect fit for the Diaspora-based fundraising on which the lobby relies. Co-sponsored by Senator Russ Feingold of Wisconsin, this change in federal election law typifies how Israeli influence became systemic.

‘McCain-Feingold’ raised the amount (from $1,000 to $2,300) that candidates can receive from individuals in primary and general elections. A couple can now contribute a combined $9,200 to federal candidates: $4,600 in each of the primary and general elections. Primary elections, usually low-budget, are particularly easy to sway.

Importantly for the Diaspora, this change also doubled the funds candidates can receive without regard to where those contributors reside. A candidate in Iowa, say, may have only a few pro-Israeli constituents. When campaign support is provided by a nationwide network of pro-Israelis, that candidate can more easily be persuaded to support policies sought by Tel Aviv.

Diaspora-based fundraising has long been used by the lobby with force-multiplying success to shape U.S. foreign policy. Under the guise of reform, John McCain doubled the financial resources that the lobby can deploy to elect and retain its supporters.

Fulbright was Right

The influence-peddling process works like this. Candidates are summoned for in-depth AIPAC interviews. Those found sufficiently committed to Israel’s agenda are provided a list of donors likely to “max out” their campaign contributions. Or the process can be made even easier when AIPAC-approved candidates are given the name of a “bundler.”

Bundlers raise funds from the Diaspora and bundle those contributions to present them to the candidate. No quid pro quo need be mentioned. After McCain-Feingold became law in 2003, AIPAC-identified bundlers could raise $1 million-plus for AIPAC-approved candidates simply by contacting ten like-minded supporters. Here’s the math:

The bundler and spouse “max out” for $9,200 and call ten others, say in Manhattan, Miami, and Beverly Hills. Each of them max out (10 x $9,200) and call ten others for a total of 11. [111 x $9,200 = $1,021,200.]

Imagine the incentive to do well in the AIPAC interview. One call from the lobby and a candidate can collect enough cash to mount a credible campaign in most Congressional districts. From Tel Aviv’s perspective, that political leverage is leveraged yet again because fewer than ten percent of the 435 House races are competitive in any election cycle (typically 35 to 50).

Additional force-multipliers come from: (a) sustaining this financial focus over multiple cycles, (b) using funds to gain and retain seniority for those serving on Congressional committees key to promoting Israeli goals, and (c) opposing candidates who question those goals.

Jewish Achievement reports that 42% of the largest political donors to the 2000 election cycle were Jewish, including four of the top five. That compares to less than 2% of Americans who are Jewish. Of the Forbes 400 richest Americans, 25% are Jewish according to Michael Steinhardt, a key funder of the Democratic Leadership Council. The DLC was led by Jewish Zionist Senator Joe Lieberman when he resigned in 2000 to run as vice president with pro-Israeli presidential candidate Al Gore.

Money was never a constraint. Pro-Israeli donors were limited only by how much they could lawfully contribute to AIPAC-screened candidates. McCain-Feingold raised a key limit. The full impact of this foreign influence has yet to be tallied. What’s known, however, is sufficient to apply the Foreign Agents Registration Act. Of the top 50 neoconservatives who advocated war in Iraq, 26 were Jewish (52%).

Harry Truman, a Christian Zionist, remains one of the more notable recipients of funds. In 1948, he was trailing badly in the polls and in fundraising. His prospects brightened dramatically in May after he recognized as a legitimate state an enclave of Jewish extremists who originally planned to settle in Argentina before putting their sights on Palestine.

That recognition was opposed by Secretary of State George C. Marshall, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the bulk of the diplomatic corps, the fledgling Central Intelligence Agency and numerous distinguished Americans, including moderate and secular Jews concerned at the troubles that were certain to follow. Not until 1984 was it revealed that a network of Jewish Zionists had funded Truman’s campaign by financially refueling his whistle-stop campaign train with $400,000 in cash ($3 million in 2009 dollars).

To buy time on the public’s airwaves, money raised from the Israel lobby’s network is paid to media outlets largely owned or managed by members of the same network. Presidents, Senators and Congressmen come and go but those who collect the checks rack up the favors that amass lasting political influence.

The U.S. system of government is meant to ensure that members of the House represent the concerns of Americans who reside in Congressional districts—not a nationally dispersed network (a Diaspora) committed to advancing the agenda of a foreign nation. Federal elections are meant to hold Senators accountable to constituents who reside in the states they represent—not out-of-state residents or a foreign government.

In practical effect, McCain-Feingold hastened a retreat from representative government by granting a nationwide network of foreign agents disproportionate influence over elections in every state and Congressional district. Campaign finance ‘reform’ enabled this network to amass even more political clout—wielding influence disproportionate to their numbers, indifferent to their place of residence and often contrary to America’s interests.

This force-multiplier is now wielded in plain sight, with impunity and under cover of free speech, free elections, free press and even the freedom of religion. Therein lies the perils of an entangled alliance that induced the U.S. to invade Iraq and now seeks war with Iran. By allowing foreign agents to operate as a domestic lobby, the U.S. was induced to confuse Zionist interests with its own.