The nomination of Sonia Sotomayor to the Supreme Court brings identity politics sharply into focus. Senate Judiciary Committee members are rightly concerned that bias and personal sympathies not take priority over the law. Those concerns provide a useful portal to assess a strategy deployed to undermine national security.
The use of identity to shape judicial decisions creates precedents unintended by lawmakers. In practical effect, those sympathies become law. Once precedents appear in court opinions, they can be expanded—again without support from legislators. Judicial activism relies on the steady expansion of precedent to broaden its impact. In similar fashion, the steady deepening of U.S.-Israeli relations reflects the impact of identity politics based on bias and personal sympathies.
But for the Holocaust, Harry Truman would likely not have recognized an enclave of Jewish extremists as a nation state. Opposition arose on all fronts, including strong objections from his Secretary of State, General George C. Marshall. Yet Truman’s bias as a Christian Zionist and his sympathies from a fundamentalist upbringing in rural Missouri led him to identify with the Jews’ return to Palestine as a means to hasten the Second Coming of the Christian Messiah.
While Truman conceded that the Zionists proclaimed a Jewish state, that is not what he recognized on May 14, 1948. Instead, he crossed out “Jewish state” and wrote the “State of Israel.” In the lead-up to that date, Truman was repeatedly assured by Zionist leaders that Israel was not intended to become a theocratic state. Yet sympathetic White House aides prepared for his signature a proclamation that would have established that precedent.
How do sympathy and empathy—whether of presidents, judges or members of Congress—alter what lawmakers intend? Is this a natural process? Or can identity politics also be deployed to manipulate? In the case of Israel, history points to historic and ongoing emotional exploitation.
Dangers of Identity Politics
Truman was a product of Kansas City’s Pendergast political machine. After the National Crime Syndicate was formed at a 1929 meeting in Atlantic City, that machine evolved into a key node in the node-and-network system of organized crime. In 1931, the syndicate’s nationwide operations were formalized in a Jews-only conclave at the Franconia Hotel in Manhattan where 24 exclusive territories were sanctioned, including five in and around New York City.
Truman was profiled, picked and “produced” to be placed in office—where he then behaved consistent with his profile. Known as “assets,” such pliable operatives do not have the state of mind that consciously connects them to what the “producers” seek to achieve. That leaves assets innocent of the intent required for criminal wrongdoing—yet complicit in the underlying objective.
Assets need only possess the requisite personality for the position. Those qualifications for office include the sympathies required to support the goals of Jewish organized crime. Thus the key role played by a Christian Zionist president in granting nation state status to a Zionist enclave. Thus, more recently, the key role of another Christian Zionist president in enabling the provocation of 911 to lead the U.S. to war in Iraq—in pursuit of Zionism’s Greater Israel policy.
But for their personal sympathies and that perceived identity of interest, would these two assets have embraced policies helpful to Jewish extremists and harmful to the national interest? Therein lies the danger when the U.S. was induced to embrace—with its post-WWII sympathy—an entangled alliance with what Barack Obama in mid-June described as a “Jewish state.”
How did an Illinois state senator with two years experience in the U.S. Senate become president at this key juncture? Two of his top-three campaign funders from Westside Chicago—Pritzker and Crown (né Krinsky)—trace their family histories to Jewish syndicates of the 1920s. The third, Hungarian-Ashkenazi George Soros, made his billions from hedge funds.
What role does identity politics play in the decision-making of the nation’s first African-American president? Did his minority status provide Tel Aviv a sympathetic ear that induced his refusal to take a firm stance on settlements in the West Bank? Did his empathy for protests in Tehran change his mind about talks with Iran, a diplomatic initiative opposed by Israel?
Was Barack Obama profiled, picked and produced to assume this position? Are his personality—and his personal history—being exploited to advance an agenda of which he is not consciously aware? As organized crime in the U.S. grew in scope and scale, its operations became more sophisticated. As this Jewish syndicate gained more power, its influence became subtler.
Those closest to this latest president are using identity politics to shape an agenda consistent not with U.S. interests but with the goals of the theocratic state that Truman feared Israel would become. One of Barack Obama’s top two aides (both are Jewish) served with the Israeli Defense Forces during the Gulf War.
The sensitivities—and sympathies—surrounding identity politics have thus far kept such analyses beyond the scope of inquiry. Yet national security requires that the use of such sophisticated psy-ops now be assessed based on the consistency of this strategy from Truman to today.
Judiciary Committee member Charles Schumer, third-ranking in the Senate leadership, quizzed Judge Sotomayor to show that bias, sympathy and empathy played no role in her decisions. Yet not once did Schumer, a key advocate of U.S. identity with Israel, mention the role played by pro-Israeli bias and sympathies in reshaping U.S. law and jeopardizing national security
Identity politics help explain how Jewish organized crime can operate in plain sight and, to date, with impunity. As “Chosen,” those complicit view sympathy and empathy as emotions to be manipulated, not reciprocated. Only in this broader strategic context can a jurist’s support for identity politics be properly assessed.